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Aspiration Dynamics of Multi-Player Games in Finite Populations
Abstract
Studying strategy update rules in the framework of evolutionary game theory, one
can differentiate between imitation processes and aspiration-driven dynamics. In the for-
mer case, individuals imitate the strategy of a more successful peer. In the latter case,
individuals adjust their strategies based on a comparison of their payoffs from the evo-
lutionary game to a value they aspire, called the level of aspiration. Unlike imitation
processes of pairwise comparison, aspiration-driven updates do not require additional
information about the strategic environment and can thus be interpreted as being more
spontaneous. Recent work has mainly focused on understanding how aspiration dynam-
ics alter the evolutionary outcome in structured populations. However, the baseline case
for understanding strategy selection is the well-mixed population case, which is still lack-
ing sufficient understanding. We explore how aspiration-driven strategy-update dynamics
under imperfect rationality influence the average abundance of a strategy in multi-player
evolutionary games with two strategies. We analytically derive a condition under which a
strategy is more abundant than the other in the weak selection limiting case. This approach
has a long standing history in evolutionary game and is mostly applied for its mathemati-
cal approachability. Hence, we also explore strong selection numerically, which shows that
our weak selection condition is a robust predictor of the average abundance of a strategy.
The condition turns out to differ from that of a wide class of imitation dynamics, as long
as the game is not dyadic. Therefore a strategy favored under imitation dynamics can
be disfavored under aspiration dynamics. This does not require any population structure
thus highlights the intrinsic difference between imitation and aspiration dynamics.
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1 Introduction
In the study of population dynamics, it turns out to be very useful to classify individual
interactions in terms of evolutionary games [1]. Early mathematical theories of strategic in-
teractions were based on the assumption of rational choice [2, 3]: an agent’s optimal action
depends on its expectations on the actions of others, and each of the other agents’ actions
depend on their expectations about the focal agent. In evolutionary game theory, successful
strategies spread by reproduction or imitation in a population [4–8].
Evolutionary game theory not only provides a platform for explaining biological problems
of frequency dependent fitness and complex individual interactions such as cooperation and
coordination [9, 10]. In finite populations, it also links the neutral process of evolution [11]
to frequency dependence by introducing an intensity of selection [12–15]. Evolutionary game
theory can also be used to study cultural dynamics including human strategic behavior and
updating [16–18]. One of the most interesting open questions is How do individuals update
their strategies based on the knowledge and conception of others and themselves?
Two fundamentally different mechanisms can be used to classify strategy updating and
population dynamics based on individuals’ knowledge about their strategic environment or
themselves: imitation of others and self-learning based on one’s own aspiration. In imitation
dynamics, players update their strategies after a comparison between their own and another
individual’s success in the evolutionary game [19–21]. For aspiration-driven updating, players
switch strategies if an aspiration level is not met, where the level of aspiration is an intrinsic
property of the focal individual [22–25]. In both dynamics, novel strategies cannot emerge
without additional mechanisms such as spontaneous exploration of strategy space (similar to
mutation) [19, 26–30]. The major difference is that the latter does not require any knowledge
about the payoffs of others. Thus aspiration level based dynamics, a form of self-learning,
require less information about an individual’s strategic environment than imitation dynamics.
Aspiration-driven strategy-update dynamics are commonly observed in studies of animal
and human behavioral ecology. For example, fish would ignore social information when
they have relevant personal information [31], and experienced ants hunt for food based on
their own previous chemical trials rather than imitating others [32]. Furthermore, a form
of aspiration-level-driven dynamics play a key role in the individual behaviors in rat pop-
ulations [33]. These examples clearly show that the idea behind aspiration dynamics, i.e.,
self-evaluation, is present in the animal world. In behavioral sciences, such aspiration-driven
strategy adjustments generally operate on the behavioral level. However, it can be speculated
that self-learning processes can have such an effect that it might actually have a downward
impact on regulatory, and thus genetic levels of brain and nervous system. This, in turn,
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could be seen as a mechanism that alters the rate of genetic change [34]. Whereas such wide
reaching systemic alterations are more speculative, it is clear that aspiration levels play a role
in human strategy updating [23].
We study the statistical mechanics of a simple case of aspiration-driven self-learning dy-
namics in well-mixed populations of finite size. Deterministic and stochastic models of
imitation dynamics have been well studied in both well-mixed and structured populations
[6,19,24,26,35,36]. For aspiration dynamics, numerous works have emerged studying popula-
tion dynamics on graphs, but its impact in well-mixed populations–a basic reference case, one
would think–is far less well understood. Although deterministic aspiration dynamics, i.e., a
kind of win-stay-lose-shift dynamics, in which individuals are perfectly rational have been an-
alyzed [37], it is not clear how processes with imperfect rationality influence the evolutionary
outcome. Here, we ask whether a strategy favored under pairwise comparison driven imita-
tion dynamics can become disfavored under aspiration-driven self-learning dynamics. To this
end, in our analytical analysis, we limit ourselves to the weak selection, or weak rationality
approximation, where payoffs via the game play little role in the decision-making [35]. As it
has been shown that under weak selection, the favored strategy is invariant for a wide class
of imitation processes [21, 27, 38]. We show that for pairwise games, the aspiration dynamics
and the imitation dynamics always share the same favored strategies. For multi-player games,
however, the weak selection criterion under aspiration dynamics that determines whether a
strategy is more abundant than the other differs from the criterion under imitation dynamics.
This paves the way to construct multi-player games, for which aspiration dynamics favor one
strategy whereas imitation dynamics favor another. Furthermore, in contrast to deterministic
aspiration dynamics, if the favored strategy is determined by a global aspiration level, the av-
erage abundance of a strategy in the stochastic aspiration dynamics is invariant with respect
to the aspiration level, provided selection is weak. We also extrapolate our results to stronger
selection cases through numerical simulation.
2 Mathematical Model
2.1 Evolutionary games
We consider evolutionary game dynamics with two strategies and d players. From these, the
more widely studied 2 × 2 games emerge as a special case [36]. In individual encounters,
players obtain their payoffs from simultaneous actions. A focal player can be of type A, or B,
and encounter a group containing k other players of type A, to receive the payoff ak, or bk.
For example, a B player, which encounters d− 1 individuals of type A, obtains payoff bd−1.
4
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An A player in a group of one other A player and thus d− 2 B players obtains payoff a1. All
possible payoffs of a focal individual are uniquely defined by the number of A in the group,
such that the payoff matrix reads
d− 1 . . . k . . . 0
A ad−1 . . . ak . . . a0
B bd−1 . . . bk . . . b0
(2.1)
For any group engaging in a one-shot game, we can obtain each member’s payoff according
to this matrix.
In a finite well-mixed population of size N, groups of size d are assembled randomly, such
that the probability of choosing a group that consists of another k players of type A, and
of d − 1− k players of type B, is given by a hypergeometric distribution [39]. For example,
the probability that an A player is in a group of k other As is given by probA( k |N, i, d ) =
(Cki−1 C
d−1−k
N−i )/C
d−1
N−1, where i (i ≥ d) is the number of A players in the population, and
Ckn = n!/( k! (n− k)! ) is the binomial coefficient.
The expected payoffs for any A or B in a population of size N, with i players of type A
and N − i players of type B, are given by
piA(i) =
d−1
∑
k=0
Cki−1 C
d−1−k
N−i
Cd−1N−1
ak, (2.2)
piB(i) =
d−1
∑
k=0
Cki C
d−1−k
N−i−1
Cd−1N−1
bk. (2.3)
In summary, we define a d-player stage game [7], shown in Eq. (2.1), from which the evo-
lutionary game emerges such that each individual obtains an expected payoff based on the
current composition of the well-mixed population. In the following, we introduce an update
rule based on a global level of aspiration. This allows us to define a Markov chain describing
the inherently stochastic dynamics in a finite population: probabilistic change of the compo-
sition of the population is driven by the fact that each individual compares its actual payoff to
an imaginary value that it aspires. Note here that we are only interested in the simplest way to
model such a complex problem and do not address any learning process that may adjust such
an aspiration level as the system evolves. For a sketch of the aspiration-driven evolutionary
game, see Fig. 1.
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Figure 1. Evolutionary game dynamics of d-player interactions driven by global aspiration. In our
mathematical model of human strategy updating driven by self-learning, a group of d players is
chosen randomly from the finite population to play the game. According to this, game players
calculate and obtain their actual payoffs. They are more likely to stochastically switch strategies if the
payoffs they aspire are not met. On the other hand, the higher the payoffs compared to the aspiration
level α are, the less likely they switch their strategies. Besides, strategy switching is also determined
by a selection intensity ω. For vanishing selection intensity, switching is entirely random irrespective
of payoffs and the aspiration level. For increasing selection intensity, the self-learning process
becomes increasingly more “optimal” in the sense that for high ω, individuals tend to always switch
when they are dissatisfied, and never switch when they are tolerant. We examine the simplest
possible setup, where the level of aspired payoff α is a global parameter that does not change with the
dynamics. We show that, however, statements about the average abundance of a strategy do not
depend on α under weak selection (ω  1).
2.2 Aspiration-level driven stochastic dynamics
In addition to the inherent stochasticity in finite populations, there is randomness in the
process of individual assessments of one’s own payoff as compared to a random sample of
the rest of the population; even if an individual knew exactly what to do, he might still fail to
switch to an optimal strategy, e.g., due to a trembling hand [40, 41].
Here we examine the simplest case of an entire population having a certain level of aspi-
ration. Players needn’t see any particular payoffs but their own, which they compare to an
aspired value. This level of aspiration, α, is a variable that influences the stochastic strategy
updating. The probability of switching strategy is random when individuals’ payoffs are close
to their level of aspiration, reflecting the basic degree of uncertainty in the population. When
payoffs exceed the aspiration, strategy switching is unlikely. At high values of aspiration
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compared to payoffs, switching probabilities are high.
The level of aspiration provides a global benchmark of tolerance or dissatisfaction in the
population. In addition, when modeling human strategy updating, one typically introduces
another global parameter that provides a measure for how important individuals deem the
impact of the actual game played on their update, the intensity of selection, ω. Irrespective of
the aspiration level and the frequency dependent payoff distribution, vanishing values of ω
refer to nearly random strategy updating. For large values of ω, individuals’ deviations from
their aspiration level have a strong impact on the dynamics.
Note that although the level of aspiration is a global variable and does not differ individ-
ually, due to payoff inhomogeneity there can always be a part of the population that seeks to
switch more often due to dissatisfaction with the payoff distribution.
In our microscopic update process, we randomly choose an individual, x, from the popula-
tion, and assume that the payoff of the focal individual is pix. To model stochastic self-learning
of aspiration-driven switching, we can use the following probability function
g( α− pix ) = 11+ e−ω ( α−pix ) , (2.4)
which is similar to the Fermi-rule [22,42], but replaces a randomly drawn opponent’s payoff by
one’s own aspiration. The wider the positive gap between aspiration and payoff, the higher the
switching probability. Reversely, if payoffs exceed the level of aspiration individuals become
less active with increasing payoffs. The aspiration level, α, provides the benchmark used to
evaluate how “greedy” an individual is. Higher aspiration levels mean that individuals aspire
to higher payoffs. If payoffs meet aspiration, individuals remain random in their updates. If
payoffs are below aspiration, switching occurs with probability larger than random; if they
are above aspiration, switching occurs with probability lower than random. The selection
intensity governs how strict individuals are in this respect. For ω = 0, strategy switching
is entirely random (neutral). Low values of ω lead to switching only slightly different from
random but follow the impact of α. For increasing ω, the impact of the difference between
payoffs and the aspiration becomes more important. In the case of ω → ∞, individuals
are strict in the sense that they either switch strategies with probability one if they are not
satisfied, or stay with their current strategy if their aspiration level is met or overshot.
The spread of successful strategies is modeled by a birth and death process in discrete
time. In one time step, three events are possible: the abundance of A, i, can increase by one
with probability p( i → i + 1 ) = T+i , decrease by one with probability p( i → i − 1 ) = T−i ,
or stay the same with probability p( i → i ) = T0i . All other transitions occur with probability
7
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zero. The transition probabilities are given by
T+i =
N − i
N
1
1+ e−ω [ α−piB(i) ]
, (2.5)
T−i =
i
N
1
1+ e−ω [ α−piA(i) ]
, (2.6)
T0i = 1− T+i − T−i . (2.7)
In each time step, a randomly chosen individual evaluates its success in the evolutionary
game, given by Eqs. (2.2), (2.3), compares it to the level of aspiration, and then changes strategy
with probability lower than 1/2 if its payoff exceeds the aspiration. Otherwise, it switches with
probability greater than 1/2, except when the aspiration level is exactly met, in which case it
switches randomly (note that this is very unlikely to ever be the case).
Compared to imitation (pairwise comparison) dynamics, our self-learning process, which
is essentially an Ehrenfest-like Markov chain, has some different characteristics. Without the
introduction of mutation or random strategy exploration, there exists a stationary distribution
for the aspiration-driven dynamics. Even in a homogenous population, there is a positive
probability that an individual can switch to another strategy due to the dissatisfaction re-
sulting from payoff-aspiration difference. This facilitates the escape from the states that are
absorbing in the pairwise comparison process and other Moran-like evolutionary dynam-
ics. Hence there exists a nontrivial stationary distribution of the Markov chain satisfying
detailed balance. Specifically, for the case of ω = 0 (neutral selection), the dynamics defined
by Eqs. (2.5)–(2.7) are characterized by linear rates, while these rates are quadratic for the
neutral imitation dynamics and Moran process.
In the following analysis and discussion, we are interested in the limit of weak selection,
ω  1, and its ability to aptly predict the success of cooperation in commonly used evo-
lutionary d−player games. The limit of weak selection, which has a long standing history
in population genetics and molecular evolution [11] also plays a role in social learning and
cultural evolution. Recent experimental results suggest that the intensity with which human
subjects adjust their strategies might be low [18]. Although it has been unclear to what degree
and in what way human strategy updating deviates from random [43, 44], the weak selection
limit is of importance to quantitatively characterize the evolutionary dynamics. In the limit-
ing case of weak selection, we are able to analytically classify strategies with respect to the
neutral benchmark, ω → 0 [19, 21, 35, 45, 46]. We note that a strategy is favored by selection,
if its average equilibrium frequency under weak selection is greater than one half. In order to
come to such a quantitative observation, we need to calculate the stationary distribution over
frequencies of strategy A.
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2.3 Stationary distribution
The Markov chain given by Eqs. (2.5)–(2.7) is a one dimensional birth and death process with
reflecting boundaries. It satisfies the detailed balance condition ψj−1 T+j−1 = ψj T
−
j , where
(ψ0,ψ1, . . . ,ψj, . . . ,ψN )
is the stationary distribution over frequencies of A in equilibrium [47, 48]. Considering
∑Nj=0 ψj = 1, we find the exact solution by recursion, given by
ψj =

j = 0 : 1
1+∑Nk=1 q
+
0 k−1/q
−
1 k
j > 0 :
q+0 j−1/q
−
1 j
1+∑Nk=1 q
+
0 k−1/q
−
1 k
, (2.8)
where q±j k = ∏
k
l=j T
±
l is the probability of successive transitions from j to k. The analytical
solution Eq. (2.8) allows us to find the exact value of the average abundance of strategy A,
〈XA〉(ω) =
N
∑
j=0
j
N
ψj(ω), (2.9)
for any strength of selection.
3 Results and Discussion
It has been shown that imitation processes are similar to each other under weak selection
[21, 27, 38]. Thus in order to compare the essential differences between imitation processes
and aspiration process, we consider such selection limit. To better understand the effects of
selection intensity, aspiration level, and payoff matrix on the average abundance of strategy A,
we further analyze which strategy is more abundant based on Eq. (2.8). For a fixed population
size, under weak selection, i.e. ω → 0, the stationary distribution ψj(ω) can be expressed
approximately as
ψj(ω) ≈ ψj(0) +ω
[
∂
∂ ω
ψj(ω)
]
ω=0
, (3.1)
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where the neutral stationary distribution is simply given by ψj(0) = C
j
N/2
N , and the first
order term of this Taylor expansion amounts to
[
∂
∂ ω
ψj(ω)
]
ω=0
=
CjN
2N+1
{
j
∑
k=1
[piA(k)− piB(k− 1) ]− 12N
N
∑
k=1
CkN
k
∑
l=1
[piA(l)− piB(l − 1) ]
}
.
(3.2)
Interestingly, in the limiting case of weak selection, the first order approximation of the sta-
tionary distribution of A does not depend on the aspiration level. For higher order terms of
selection intensity, however, ψj(ω) does depend on the aspiration level.
In the following we discuss the condition under which a strategy is favored and compare
the predictions for stationary strategy abundance under self-learning and under imitation
dynamics. Thereafter we consider three prominent examples of games with multiple players
through analytical, numerical and simulation methods, the results of which are detailed in
Figs. 2–4 and Appendix B. All three examples are social dilemmas in the sense that the Nash
equilibrium of the one-shot game is not the social optimum. First, the widely studied public
goods game represents the class of games where there is only one pure Nash equilibrium
[49]. Next, the public goods game with a threshold, a simplified version of the collective
risk dilemma [50–52], represents the class of coordination games with multiple pure Nash
equilibria, depending on the threshold. Last, we consider the d-player volunteer’s dilemma,
or snowdrift game, which has a mixed Nash equilibrium [53, 54].
3.1 Average abundance of strategy A
Based on the approximation (3.1), for any symmetric multi-player game with two strategies of
normal form (2.1), we can now calculate a weak selection condition such that in equilibrium A
is more abundant than B. Since for neutrality, ψj(0) = C
j
N/2
N holds and thus 〈XA〉(0) = 1/2,
it is sufficient to consider positivity of the sum of jω [ ∂ω ψj(ω) ]ω=0/N over all j = 0, . . . , N.
Under weak selection, strategy A is favored by selection, i.e., 〈XA〉(ω) > 1/2, if
d−1
∑
k=0
Ckd−1 ( ak − bk ) > 0, (3.3)
which holds for any d-player games with two strategies in a population with more than two
individuals. For a detailed derivation of our main analytical result, see Appendix A. Note
that for a two-player game, d = 2, the above condition simplifies to a1 + a0 > b1 + b0, which is
similar to the concept of risk-dominance translated to finite populations [35].
The left hand side expression of inequality (3.3) can also be compared to a similar condi-
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tion under the class of pairwise comparison processes [19, 22], where two randomly selected
individuals compare their payoffs and switch with a certain probability based on the observed
inequality. Typically, weak selection results for pairwise comparison processes lead to the re-
sult that strategy A is favored by selection if [35, 55, 56]
d−1
∑
k=0
( ak − bk ) > 0, (3.4)
which applies both, to evaluate whether fixation of A is more likely than fixation of B, or
whether the average abundance of A is greater than one half under weak mutation and weak
selection, that can be shown using properties of the embedded Markov chain [57]. The sums
on the left hand sides of (3.3) and (3.4) can thus be compared with each other in order to
reveal the nature of our self-learning process driven by a global aspiration level.
Our main result, Eq. (3.3), holds for a variety of self-learning dynamics, not only for
the probability function given by Eq. (2.4). Considering the general self-learning function
g[ω ( α − pix ) ] with g(0) 6= 0, here g(x) is strictly increasing with increasing x. Denoting
u = ω ( α− pix ), we have g′(ω) = g′(u) u′(ω). Then, for ω → 0, g′(ω)|ω=0 = g′(0) ( α− pix ),
and Eq. (3.2) can be rewritten in a more general form
[
∂
∂ ω
ψj(ω)
]
ω=0
=
g′(0)
g(0)
CjN
22N
{
2N
j
∑
k=1
[piA(k)− piB(k− 1) ]−
N
∑
k=1
CkN
k
∑
i=1
[piA(i)− piB(i− 1) ]
}
.
(3.5)
Since g′(0)/g(0) is a positive constant, Eq. (3.3) is still valid for any such probability function
g(x), see Appendix A.
3.2 Linear public goods game
Public goods games emerge when groups of players engage in the sustenance of common
goods. Cooperators A pay an individual cost in form of a contribution c that is pooled into
the common pot. Defectors B do not contribute. The pot is then multiplied by a characteristic
multiplication factor r and shared equally among all individuals in the group, irrespective
of contribution. If the multiplication factor is smaller than the size of the group d, each
cooperator recovers only a fraction of the initial investment. Switching to defection would
always be beneficial in a pairwise comparison of the two strategies. The payoff matrix thus
11
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reads
d− 1 . . . k . . . 1 0
A r c− c . . . k+1d r c− c . . . 2d r c− c r cd − c
B d−1d r c . . .
k
d r c . . .
r c
d 0
(3.6)
where 1 < r < d is typically assumed. Since ak − bk = c (r/d− 1) is a negative constant for
any number of cooperators in the group, we find that
d−1
∑
k=0
Ckd−1 ( ak − bk ) = 2d−1 c
( r
d
− 1
)
(3.7)
is always negative. Cooperation cannot be the more abundant strategy in the well-mixed
population (see Fig. 2). However, if the self-learning dynamics are driven by a sufficiently
high aspiration level, individuals are constantly dissatisfied and switch strategy frequently,
even as defectors, such that cooperation can break even if selection is strong enough, namely
limα→∞〈XA〉 = 1/2 for all values ω. On the other hand, if the aspiration level is low, coopera-
tors switch more often than defectors such that the average abundance of A assumes a value
closer to the evolutionary stable state of full defection, which depends on ω. In the extreme
case of very low α and strong selection, defectors fully dominate, thus the stationary measure
retracts to the all defection state.
3.3 Threshold public goods game
Here we consider the following public goods game with a threshold in the sense that the
good becomes strictly unavailable when the number of cooperators in a group is below a
critical threshold, m. This threshold becomes a new strategic variable. Here, c is an initial
endowment given to each player, which is invested in full by cooperators. Whatever the
cooperators manage to invest is multiplied by r and redistributed among all players in the
group irrespective of strategy, if the threshold investment m c is met. Defectors do not make
any investment, and thus have an additional payoff of c, as long as the threshold is met. Once
the number of cooperators is below m, all payoffs are zero, which compares to the highest risk
possible (loss of endowment and investment with certainty) in what is called the collective-
risk dilemma [50, 52]. The payoff matrix for the two strategies, cooperation A, and defection
12
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Figure 2. Mean (stationary) fraction of cooperators for the linear public goods game. The common
parameters are aspiration level α = 1, population size N = 100, and cost of cooperation c = 1. In both
panels, the group sizes are d = 10 (dark shaded), and d = 20 (light shaded). Panel A shows the mean
fraction of cooperators as a function of selection intensity for r = 2, the inset shows a detail for lower
selection intensities. Panel B shows the mean fraction of cooperators as a function of selection
intensity for r = d/2. The inset shows the stationary distribution for d = 10, r = 5 and ω = 0.5, 5.
B, reads
d− 1 . . . m m− 1 m− 2 . . . 0
A r c . . . m+1d r c
m
d r c 0 . . . 0
B d−1d r c + c . . .
m
d r c + c 0 0 . . . 0
(3.8)
We can examine when the self-learning process favors cooperation. We can also seek to make
a statement about whether under self-learning dynamics, cooperation performs better than
under pairwise comparison process. For self-learning dynamics, we find
d−1
∑
k=0
Ckd−1 ( ak − bk ) =
d−1
∑
k=m
Ckd−1 ( r c/d− c ) + Cm−1d−1 (m r c/d )
while the equivalent statement for pairwise comparison processes based on the same payoff
matrix would be ∑d−1k=0( ak − bk ) = c ( r +m− d ). Thus, the criterion of self-learning dynamics
can be written as
r > ( d
d−1
∑
k=m
Ckd−1)/(
d−1
∑
k=m
Ckd−1 + m C
m−1
d−1 )
13
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whereas positivity of the imitation processes condition, ∑d−1k=0( ak − bk ) > 0, simply leads to
r > d−m. Comparing the two conditions, we find
( d−m )− d ∑
d−1
k=m C
k
d−1
∑d−1k=m C
k
d−1 + m C
m−1
d−1
=
m
∑d−1k=m C
k
d−1 + m C
m−1
d−1
Γd,m. (3.9)
Since the first factor on the right hand side of Eq. (3.9) is always positive, the factor
Γd,m = ( d−m )Cm−1d−1 −
d−1
∑
k=m
Ckd−1 (3.10)
determines the relationship between self-learning dynamics and pairwise comparison pro-
cesses: for sufficiently large threshold m, expression (3.10) is positive. In conclusion, the
aspiration-level-driven self-learning dynamics can afford to be less strict than the pairwise
comparison process. Namely, it requires less reward for cooperators’ contribution to the com-
mon pool (lower levels of r) in order to promote the cooperative strategy. The amount of
cooperative strategy depends on the threshold: higher thresholds support cooperation, even
for lower multiplication factors r (see Fig. 3). For fixed r, our self-learning dynamics are more
likely to promote cooperation in a threshold public goods game, if the threshold for the num-
ber of cooperators needed to support the public goods is large enough, i.e., not too different
from the total size of the group. For small thresholds, and thus higher temptation to defect
in groups with less cooperators, we approach the regular public goods games, and the con-
clusion may be reversed. Under such small m cases, imitation-driven (pairwise comparison)
dynamics are more likely to lead to cooperation than aspiration dynamics.
3.4 d-player snowdrift game
Evolutionary games between two strategies can have mixed evolutionary stable states [6, 36].
Strategy A can invade B and B can invade A; a stable coexistence of the two strategies typically
evolves. In the replicator dynamics of the snowdrift game, cooperators can be invaded by
defectors as the temptation to defect is still larger than the reward of mutual cooperation
[54, 58]. In contrast to the public goods game, cooperation with a group of defectors now
yields a payoff greater than exclusive defection. The act of cooperation provides a benefit to
all members of the group, and the cost of cooperation is equally shared among the number of
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Figure 3. Mean (stationary) fraction of cooperators for the threshold public goods game. The
common parameters are aspiration level α = 1, population size N = 100, group size d = 10, and cost
of cooperation c = 1. In both panels, the threshold sizes are m = 4 (dark shaded), and m = 7 (light
shaded). Panel A shows the mean fraction of cooperators as a function of selection intensity for r = 2.
The inset shows the critical multiplication factor above which cooperation is more abundant as a
function of the threshold m. High thresholds lower the critical multiplication factor of the public good
such that cooperation can become more abundant than defection. Panel B shows the mean fraction of
cooperators as a function of selection intensity for r = 4. The inset shows the stationary distribution
for d = 10, r = 4, ω = 2, and m = 4, 7.
cooperators [59]. Hence, the payoff matrix reads
d− 1 . . . k . . . 1 0
A b− cd . . . b− ck+1 . . . b− c2 b− c
B b . . . b . . . b 0
(3.11)
Cooperation can maintain a minimal positive payoff from the cooperative act, then cooperation
and defection can coexist. The snowdrift game is a social dilemma, as selection does not favor
the social optimum of exclusive cooperation. The level of coexistence depends on the amount
of cost that a particular cooperator has to contribute in a certain group. Evaluating the weak
selection condition, (3.3) in case of the d-player snowdrift game leads to the condition
d−1
∑
k=0
Ckd−1
k + 1
<
b
c
(3.12)
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in order to observe 〈XA〉 > 1/2 in aspiration dynamics under weak selection. For imitation
processes, on the other hand, we find ∑d−1k=0 1/(k + 1) < b/c. Note that, except for a0 − b0 =
b− c > 0, ak − bk < 0 holds for any other k. Because of this, the different nature of these two
conditions, given by the positive coefficients Ckd−1 > 1 for any d > k > 0, reveals that self-
learning dynamics narrow down the parameter range for which cooperation can be favored
by selection. In the snowdrift game, self-learning dynamics are less likely to favor cooperation
than pairwise comparison processes. Larger group size d hinders cooperation: the larger the
group, the higher the benefit of cooperation, b, has to be in order to support cooperation (see
Fig. 4).
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Figure 4. Mean (stationary) fraction of cooperators for the d-player snowdrift game. The common
parameters are aspiration level α = 1, population size N = 100, and cost of cooperation c = 1. In both
panels, the group sizes are d = 5 (dark shaded), and d = 10 (light shaded). Panel A shows the mean
fraction of cooperators as a function of selection intensity for b = 1.5. The inset shows the cooperation
condition as a function of group size d for benefits b = 1.5, 15.0. Only for high benefit and low group
size, cooperation can be more abundant than defection. Panel B shows the mean fraction of
cooperators as a function of selection intensity for b = 15.0. The inset shows the stationary
distribution for b = 15.0, ω = 2, and d = 5, 10.
4 Summary and Conclusions
Previous studies on self-learning mechanism have typically been investigated on graphs via
simulations, which often employ stochastic aspiration-driven update rules [23, 25, 60–62]. Al-
though results based on the mean field approximations are insightful [24,25], further analytical
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insights have been lacking so far. Thus it is constructive to introduce and discuss a reference
case of stochastic aspiration-driven dynamics of self-learning in well-mixed populations. To
this end, here we introduce and discuss such an evolutionary process. Our weak selection
analysis is based on a simplified scenario that implements a non-adaptive self-learning pro-
cess with global aspiration level.
Probabilistic evolutionary game dynamics driven by aspiration are inherently innovative
and do not have absorbing boundaries even in the absence of mutation or random strategy
exploration. We study the equilibrium strategy distribution in a finite population and make a
weak selection approximation for the average strategy abundance for any multi-player game
with two strategies, which turns out to be independent of the level of aspiration. This is dif-
ferent from the aspiration dynamics in infinitely large populations, where the evolutionary
outcome crucially depends on the aspiration level [37]. Thus it highlights the intrinsic differ-
ences arising from finite stochastic dynamics of multi-player games between two strategies.
Based on this we derive a condition for one strategy to be favored over the other. This condi-
tion then allows a comparison of a strategy’s performance to other prominent game dynamics
based on pairwise comparison between two strategies.
Most of the complex strategic interactions in natural populations, ranging from competi-
tion and cooperation in microbial communities to social dilemmas in humans, take place in
groups rather than pairs. Thus multi-player games have attracted increasing interest in differ-
ent areas [36, 63–68]. The most straightforward form of multi-player games makes use of the
generalization of the payoff matrix concept [63]. Such multi-player games are more complex
and show intrinsic difference from 2× 2 games. Hence, as examples here we have studied
the dynamics of one of the most widely studied multi-player games–the linear public goods
game [64], a simplified version of a threshold public goods game that requires a group of
players to coordinate contributions to a public good [17,50–52,69,70], as well as a multi-player
version of the snowdrift game [66] where coexistence is possible. Our analytical finding allows
a characterization of the evolutionary success under the stochastic aspiration-driven update
rules introduced here, as well as a comparison to the well known results of pairwise compar-
ison processes. While in coordination games, such as the threshold public goods game, the
self-learning dynamics support cooperation on a larger set in parameter space; the opposite is
true for coexistence games, where the condition for cooperation to be more abundant becomes
more strict.
It will be interesting to derive analytical results that either hold for any intensity of se-
lection, or at least for the limiting case of strong selection [13, 71] in finite populations. On
the other hand, the update rule presented here does not seem to allow a proper continuous
limit in the transition to infinitely large populations [20], which might give rise to interest-
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ing rescaling requirements of the demographic noise in the continuous approximation [72] in
self-learning dynamics.
Our simple model illustrates that aspiration-driven self-learning dynamics in well-mixed
populations alone may be sufficient to alter the expected strategy abundance. On previous
studies of such processes in structured populations [25, 60–62], this effect might have been
overshadowed by the properties of the network dynamics studied in silico. Our analytical
results hold for weak selection, which might be a useful framework in the study of human
interactions [18], where it is still unclear to what role model individuals compare their payoffs
and with what strength players update their strategies [18, 30, 44]. Although weak selection
approximations are widely applied in the study of frequency dependent selection [27, 29, 35,
45], it is not clear whether the successful spread of behavioral traits operates in this parameter
regime. Thus, by numerical evaluation and simulations we show that our weak selection
predictions also hold for strong selection. Models such as the one presented here may be
used in attempts to predict human strategic dynamics [73, 74]. Such predictions, likely to be
falsified in their simplicity [75], are essential to our fundamental understanding of complex
economic and social behavior and may guide statistical insights to the effective functioning of
the human mind.
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A Appendix
In this appendix, we detail the deducing process of the criterion of 〈XA〉(ω) > 1/2 for general
d-player game. We consider the first order approximation of stationary distribution, ψj(ω),
and get the criterion condition (shown in Sec. 3), as follows:
N
∑
j=0
j
N
[
∂
∂ω
ψj(ω)
]
ω=0
ω > 0. (A.1)
Inserting Eq. (2.8), we have
∂
∂ω
ψj(ω) =
(∏
j−1
i=0 T
+
i
∏
j
i=1 T
−
i
)′ (1+∑N−1k=0
∏ki=0 T
+
i
∏k+1i=1 T
−
i
)− (∏
j−1
i=0 T
+
i
∏
j
i=1 T
−
i
) (1+∑N−1k=0
∏ki=0 T
+
i
∏k+1i=1 T
−
i
)′
(1+∑N−1k=0
∏ki=0 T
+
i
∏k+1i=1 T
−
i
)2
. (A.2)
Denoting ψj(ω) = ψN/ψD, the above equation can be simplified as
∂
∂ω
ψj(ω) =
ψ′N ψD − ψN ψ′D
ψ2D
, (A.3)
where
ψ′N = (
∏
j−1
i=0 T
+
i
∏
j
i=1 T
−
i
)′ =
(∏
j−1
i=0 T
+
i )
′ (∏ji=1 T
−
i )− (∏j−1i=0 T+i ) (∏ji=1 T−i )′
(∏
j
i=1 T
−
i )
2
=
[∑
j−1
i=0(T
+
i )
′ (∏j−1k=0,k 6=i T
+
k )] (∏
j
i=1 T
−
i )− (∏j−1i=0 T+i ) [∑ji=1(T−i )′ (∏jk=1,k 6=i T−k )]
(∏
j
i=1 T
−
i )
2
, (A.4)
ψ′D = (1+
N−1
∑
k=0
∏ki=0 T
+
i
∏k+1i=1 T
−
i
)′ =
N−1
∑
k=0
(∏ki=0 T
+
i )
′ (∏k+1i=1 T
−
i )− (∏ki=0 T+i ) (∏k+1i=1 T−i )′
(∏k+1i=1 T
−
i )
2
=
N−1
∑
k=0
[∑ki=0(T
+
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−
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2
. (A.5)
We have
(T+i )
′ =
N − i
N
{
1
1+ e−ω [α−piB(i)]
}′
=
N − i
N
{
e−ω [α−piB(i)]
}
[α− piB(i)]
{1+ e−ω [α−piB(i)]}2 , (A.6)
(T−i )
′ =
i
N
{
1
1+ e−ω [α−piA(i)]
}′
=
i
N
{
e−ω [α−piA(i)]
}
[α− piA(i)]{
1+ e−ω [α−piA(i)]
}2 . (A.7)
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Since ω → 0,
(T+i )
′∣∣
ω=0 =
N − i
4N
[α− piB(i)], (A.8)
(T−i )
′∣∣
ω=0 =
i
4N
[α− piA(i)], (A.9)
(
j−1
∏
i=0
T+i )
∣∣∣∣∣
ω=0
=
j−1
∏
i=0
N − i
2N
=
N!
(N − j)! (2N)j , (A.10)
(
j
∏
i=1
T−i )
∣∣∣∣∣
ω=0
=
j
∏
i=1
i
2N
=
j!
(2N)j
, (A.11)
[
j−1
∑
i=0
(T+i )
′ (
j−1
∏
k=0,k 6=i
T+k )]
∣∣∣∣∣
ω=0
=
N! ∑
j−1
i=0[α− piB(i)]
2 (N − j)! (2N)j , (A.12)
[
j
∑
i=1
(T−i )
′ (
j
∏
k=1,k 6=i
T−k )]
∣∣∣∣∣
ω=0
=
j! ∑ji=1[α− piA(i)]
2 (2N)j
. (A.13)
Then, inserting Eqs. (A.10)–(A.13) into Eq. (A.4),
ψ′N
∣∣
ω=0 =
N!
2 (N−j)! (2N)j
{
∑
j−1
i=0[α− piB(i)]
}
j!
(2N)j − N!(N−j)! (2N)j
j!
2 (2N)j ∑
j
i=1[α− piA(i)]
[ j!
(2N)j ]
2
=
N!
2 j! (N − j)! [−
j−1
∑
i=0
piB(i) +
j
∑
i=1
piA(i) ]
=
CjN
2
j
∑
i=1
[piA(i)− piB(i− 1) ] . (A.14)
Similarly, we can get
ψ′D
∣∣
ω=0 =
N−1
∑
k=0
{
N!
2 (N−k−1)! (2N)k+1 ∑
k
i=0[α− piB(i)] (k+1)!(2N)k+1
[ (k+1)!
(2N)k+1 ]
2
−
N!
(N−k−1)! (2N)k+1
(k+1)!
2 (2N)k+1 ∑
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}
=
N
∑
k=1
CkN
2
k
∑
i=1
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And
ψD|ω=0 = 1+
N−1
∑
k=0
∏ki=0
N−i
2N
∏k+1i=1
i
2N
= 1+
N−1
∑
k=0
Ck+1N = 2
N , (A.16)
ψN |ω=0 =
∏
j−1
i=0
N−i
2N
∏
j
i=1
i
2N
= CjN . (A.17)
Therefore, inserting Eqs. (A.14)–(A.17) into Eq. (A.3),
[
∂
∂ω
ψj(ω)
]
ω=0
=
CjN {∑ji=1[piA(i)− piB(i− 1)]} 2N
2 (2N)2
− C
j
N ∑
N−1
k=0 {Ck+1N ∑k+1i=1 [piA(i)− piB(i− 1)]}
2 (2N)2
. (A.18)
Combined with Eq. (A.1), the criterion is rewritten as
N
∑
j=1
jω
N
(
CjN {∑ji=1[piA(i)− piB(i− 1)]} 2N
2 (2N)2
− C
j
N ∑
N−1
k=0 {Ck+1N ∑k+1i=1 [piA(i)− piB(i− 1)]}
2 (2N)2
) > 0, (A.19)
where piA(i) and piB(i− 1) refer to Eqs. (2.2), and (2.3). Hence,
piA(i)− piB(i− 1) =
d−1
∑
k=0
Cki−1 C
d−1−k
N−i
Cd−1N−1
(ak − bk). (A.20)
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Therefore the criterion equals to
N
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∑
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We can prove that the above inequality leads to a general criterion as follows
ω
4 (2d)
d−1
∑
k=0
[
Ckd−1 (ak − bk)
]
> 0. (A.22)
This is the result we want to show. For this, we only need to demonstrate
ω
4 N (2N)
[
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(A.23)
This equals to
N
∑
j=1
(2j− N)CjN
j
∑
i=1
d−1
∑
k=0
Cki−1 C
d−1−k
N−i
Cd−1N−1
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Since such equation should hold for any choice of (ak − bk)s, thus
N
∑
j=1
(2j− N)CjN
j
∑
i=1
Cki−1 C
d−1−k
N−i
Cd−1N−1
= 2N−d N Ckd−1. (A.25)
Using the identity ∑Nj=1 ∑
j
i=1 = ∑
N
i=1 ∑
N
j=i, we can simplify the equivalent condition as
N
∑
i=1
Cki−1 C
d−1−k
N−i
N
∑
j=i
(2j− N)CjN = 2N−d N Cd−1N−1 Ckd−1. (A.26)
This can be easily proved through mathematical induction.
Thus, we get the criterion of 〈XA〉(ω) > 1/2 for general multi-player games as Eq. (A.22).
We rewrite this as follows
d−1
∑
k=0
Ckd−1 (ak − bk) > 0. (A.27)
B Appendix
In the following tables, we demonstrate how selection intensity ω and the population size N
influence the evolutionary results (the average fraction of cooperators) through simulation.
Table 1. Simulation results for Linear public goods game. The parameters are: d=10, α=1, r=2, and
c=1. Under such setting, the criterion Eq. (3.3) we analytically deduced reads: ∑d−1k=0 C
k
d−1 (ak − bk) < 0,
which means the fraction of cooperators 〈XA〉 < 0.5.
ω=0.01 ω=0.1 ω=1 ω=5 ω=10
N=50 0.49924 0.4909 0.43151 0.42745 0.45081
N=100 0.49885 0.49071 0.43133 0.42905 0.45519
N=200 0.4994 0.48993 0.43192 0.42999 0.45694
N=1000 0.49804 0.49037 0.43188 0.43076 0.45875
(B.1)
It is found that for the examples we discussed, namely the linear public goods game, the
threshold collective risk dilemma and a multi-player snowdrift game, our result under weak
selection can be generalized for a wide range of parameters (higher values of ω, small and
large populations).
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Table 2. Simulation results for Threshold public goods game. The parameters are: d=10, α=1, c=1,
and m=7. Under such setting, the criterion Eq. (3.3) reads: ∑d−1k=0 C
k
d−1 (ak − bk) > 0, which means the
average fraction of cooperators 〈XA〉 > 0.5.
ω=0.01 ω=0.1 ω=1 ω=5 ω=10
N=50 0.5003 0.50466 0.56262 0.77205 0.71618
N=100 0.50079 0.50451 0.56173 0.7626 0.71218
N=200 0.50087 0.50467 0.56206 0.76144 0.71154
N=1000 0.50017 0.50472 0.56054 0.75942 0.71162
(B.2)
Table 3. Simulation results for multiple Snowdrift game. The parameters are: d=10, α=1, b=1.5, and
c=1. Under such setting, the criterion Eq. (3.3) reads: ∑d−1k=0 C
k
d−1 (ak − bk) < 0, which means the
average fraction of cooperators 〈XA〉 < 0.5.
ω=0.01 ω=0.1 ω=1 ω=5 ω=10
N=50 0.49999 0.49758 0.469955 0.262065 0.164099
N=100 0.499545 0.497307 0.470687 0.261983 0.167228
N=200 0.499789 0.497168 0.469876 0.261832 0.168782
N=1000 0.49978 0.49765 0.46985 0.26296 0.16973
(B.3)
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